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• In Canada, retail payments involve various
payment instruments and interrelated systems
operated by the Canadian Payments Association,
the Interac Association, and new Internet
payment providers. The efﬁcient, secure, and
reliable operation of these retail payment systems
is critical to productive commercial activities and
well-functioning markets for retail ﬁnancial
services.
• Recent structural changes within the broad retail
payment system largely reﬂect the emergence of
user-friendly information technologies and
substantial changes in ﬁnancial sector policy
aimed at enhancing competition in ﬁnancial
services. The principal results have been growth
in the volume and types of electronic payments
and increased participation by diverse groups of
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial institutions as
providers of retail payment services.
• These innovations are challenging existing public
and private sector policies governing retail pay-
ments, including the market arrangements for
services; customer risks and costs for settling
large-value retail payments; the security of
payment information and the efﬁciency with
which it is transmitted; and the effects of differing
regulatory regimes on competition among
providers of retail payment services.
ven though Canadians use the retail payment
system every day in their various transactions,
general information about its role, and about
the issues affecting it, is limited. Broadly
deﬁned, a payment system has many components.
Among these are payment instruments, such as cash,
cheques, and credit cards; information technologies
used to communicate and process payment informa-
tion for the transacting parties and their ﬁnancial
institutions; and funds-transfer processes that are
involved in the transfer of Bank of Canada funds
between the ﬁnancial institutions that hold the trans-
acting parties’ payment accounts. There are a variety
of institutions, each specializing in different services,
required to initiate and settle a payment obligation. As
for “retail” payments, there is no simple deﬁnition.
They refer generally to obligations arising from retail
commercial and ﬁnancial transactions between indi-
viduals and businesses as transfers between them and
governments. Not all individual retail payments are
for small amounts, but compared to the large-value
payments related to ﬁnancial transactions between
institutions, they have a much smaller average value
and much greater daily volumes. They also involve a
much broader range of payment instruments and
transaction systems (CPSS 1999).
While everyone has some knowledge of various retail
payment instruments, few have as much information
about the infrastructure designed to process these
payment instruments and transfer the funds. Yet it is
the efficient and reliable operation of these infrastructure
systems that is really the engine for the retail payment
system.
The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the
emergingissuesandchallengesfortheCanadianpublic
E
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and private sectors with regard to the infrastructure
for retail payment systems. The article briefly describes
the organization of non-cash systems for retail pay-
mentsandthestructureandconductofmarketsfor their
infrastructure services in Canada. It identiﬁes the sig-
niﬁcant developments in the sector in recent years and
discusses some of the emerging issues and initiatives.
For readers unfamiliar with payment systems, a glos-
sary of key terms is appended.
The Organization
of Retail Payment Systems
Despite some national and international differences
among speciﬁc retail payment systems, most have a
similar organizational structure (see below). Typically,
they include three types of integrated systems: trans-
action systems, clearing systems, and settlement sys-
tems (CPSS 2000).
Chart 1 illustrates the organization of a retail payment
system and the routing of the ﬂow of payment infor-
mation and funds through its transaction, clearing,
and settlement systems.
The clearing process for retail payments may be
highly integrated with transaction systems where
such systems are highly centralized and standardized
for participating ﬁnancial institutions as, for example,
with credit cards. This limits the amount of internal
processing required of the paying and receiving insti-
tutions. The transaction system and the payment-
clearing system for card payments are generally oper-
ated by the same organization, which sets out the
common standards for use by the participating insti-
tutions and their data processors. Other payment
instruments with more decentralized transaction sys-
tems owned and operated by individual institutions,
such as cheques and automated direct credits and
• processing payment data
• calculating members’ settlement claims and
obligations, and
• transmitting relevant data to the individual mem-
ber institutions and to the settlement bank.
Settlement Systems
Settlement is the process by which previously cal-
culated payment obligations and receivables are
discharged through transfers between deposit
accounts that the institutions hold at the central
bank or at private banks.
Steps in the settlement process are:
• verifying positions for the transfer of funds
between banks and the availability of funds in
the paying institution’s settlement account
• settling the obligations by posting the funds
transfers to an institution’s settlement account,
and conﬁrming the completed settlement with
the account holders
The Structure of Retail Payment Systems
Transaction Systems
Use information and communication technologies
to deliver payment instructions and information
between the parties to a payment transaction and
their respective ﬁnancial institutions.
Principal transaction services include:
• verifying the identity of the parties and their
ability to pay
• validating the payment instructions, and
• communicating information among the parties
and their ﬁnancial institutions.
Clearing Systems
Clearing systems are involved in the bilateral
exchange of information on individual payments
and payment items between ﬁnancial institutions
and the calculation of their settlement positions.
The clearing process principally involves:
• bilateral sorting and matching transactions
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debits, may be less integrated organizationally and
technologically with their clearing systems. These
instruments often require more processing by the
institutions providing them or the clearing organiza-
tion to translate payment information from the for-
mats of the transaction systems into the standardized
formats required for the interbank clearing and settle-
ment of the payment obligations. In this case, the
clearing systems are generally more closely integrated
with the settlement systems than with the transaction
systems.
The Retail Payment System in Canada
While the retail payment system in Canada ﬁts well
within the generic structure described above, knowl-
edge of some of the unique features of the Canadian
system is necessary to understand the emerging
issues.
Clearing and settlement systems
The Automated Clearing Settlement System
In Canada, the principal systems for clearing and
settling payments between financial institutions
are operated by the Canadian Payments Association
(CPA). The CPA is a private, member-owned, non-
proﬁt organization incorporated under the Canadian
Payments (CP) Act. The members of the CPA are the
ﬁnancial institutions that provide payment accounts,
instruments, and services to individuals and busi-
nesses. They are eligible under the CP Act to partici-
pate directly or indirectly in the CPA’S clearing and
settlement systems. The CPA’S retail system is the
Automated Clearing Settlement System (ACSS).1
Direct participants in the ACSS hold settlement
1.   See PSAC 1997a for a description of the ACSS prior to the establishment of
the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). A detailed description of the LVTS is
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accounts at the Bank of Canada and have access to the
Bank’s credit facilities. ACSS payments are cleared
through several streams (or subsystems).2 The gross
payables and receivables of each participant in each
stream are combined and netted over all the partici-
pants to obtain their individual net settlement posi-
tions.3 The clearing and settlement functions of the
ACSS are highly integrated within the system.
Credit card systems
Not all retail payments are cleared and settled through
the ACSS. Most notably, Visa® and MasterCard® pay-
ments in Canada are cleared and settled in their own
systems. In this case, the individual card payments
clear through the organizations’ systems located in the
United States, and Visa and MasterCard systems hold
their Canadian-dollar settlement accounts with a
direct participant in the Large Value Transfer System
(LVTS). The settlement obligations between these cen-
tral counterparties and the Canadian ﬁnancial institu-
tions participating in the card systems are transferred
to and from the settlement banks for Visa and Master-
Card, respectively, over the LVTS.
Transaction systems
Individual ﬁnancial institutions in Canada operate
various proprietary transaction systems for their cus-
tomers. These range from on-line systems for their
Internet banking operations to their branch-banking
and ATM (automated teller machines) networks. Most
are designed to provide payment and related services
onlytotheirowncustomers.Manyoftheseinstitutions
also participate and invest, however, in transaction
systems that allow them to provide payment services
to their customers through shared or common net-
works. Some shared networks are arranged to link the
proprietary systems of the participating institutions.
Other common networks are operated by an organiza-
tion that is either independently owned or is jointly
owned by its participating members.
Card-based transaction systems
Most global shared transaction systems for credit card
payments are operated by organizations such as Visa,
2. Each of the payment streams in the ACSS is speciﬁed around common char-
acteristics of various payment instruments. The principal streams are large-
value ($50,000 and over) and small-value cheques and paper items, auto-
mated funds transfers (debits and credits), electronic data interchange (EDI)
payments, and point-of-sale (ATM and EFT/POS—electronic funds transfer at
point of sale) payments.
3.   See PSAC 1997a for a numerical example of netting schemes.
MasterCard, and American Express.® These are typi-
cally on-line transaction systems allow the card-hold-
ing customers of member institutions to access their
credit lines immediately and their retail business cus-
tomers to acquire authorized payments. The commu-
nication services of the transaction systems, along
with the standards and protocols for the electronic
payment instructions, are designed and operated by
the network service providers associated with the
credit card organization.
The principal debit and ATM-card transaction systems
in Canada are also shared networks. Interac,® for
example, connects proprietary ATM networks of
individual member institutions via its Shared Cash
Dispensing (SCD) system, which allows customers of a
deposit-taking institution to withdraw cash from their
account using an ATM of another member institution.
Indeed, some organizations only participate in the
SCDsystem through the operation of networks of ATM
machines, without providing any deposit services to
customers. They provide cash to the deposit custom-
ers of other institutions and are reimbursed through
interbank transfers over the ACSS. Interac also inter-
connects the networks of participating institutions for
point-of-sale electronic funds transfers (EFT/POS)
through its Interac Direct Payment (IDP) system. In
this case, merchants obtain IDP-equipped terminals
from either their deposit-taking institutions or an
independent non-ﬁnancial service provider to allow
holders of Interac-enabled debit cards issued by other
institutions to make veriﬁable, real-time payments to
the merchant.
Although Interac is the largest operator of shared ATM
and EFT/POS systems in Canada, similar but smaller
domestic network arrangements operate for speciﬁc
regions or types of institutions, such as credit unions
or caisse populaires. In addition, the major global net-
works, such as the ATM networks connected through
Visa PLUS® and MasterCard’s Cirrus,® and Master-
Card’s Maestro® EFT/POS network, also operate in
Canada to facilitate cross-border retail payments for
their members’ customers.
Internet transaction systems
New forms of transaction systems are emerging from
alliances between ﬁnancial institutions and IT organi-
zations aimed at developing Internet payment schemes.
These transaction systems use transmission architec-
tures for payment information that are more open
than those of most traditional proprietary systems.27 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
Among the most notable in Canada are various elec-
tronic bill-presentment and payment (EBPP) systems
such as epost,™ e-route, and CertaPay. These systems
link participating merchants, customers, and their
ﬁnancial institutions to allow merchants to electroni-
cally bill their customers and the customers to elec-
tronically deliver the payments in an environment
where their information is secure. The interbank set-
tlement of these consumer payments is through the
ACSS.
Other emerging Internet payment systems, such as
hyperWallet, settle their retail payments through non-
CPA Systems. Only the funds transferred to and from
the customers’ “wallets” through their ﬁnancial insti-
tutions’ on-line banking systems are cleared and set-
tled in the ACSS with hyperWallet’s settlement bank.
The policy problem for payment
systems is how best to beneﬁt from




Both new technology-driven payment applications
and changes in ﬁnancial sector policy aimed at
improving competition and efﬁciency in ﬁnancial
services have been driving developments in retail
payments over the past decade. Balancing this drive
for greater efﬁciency in payment-service markets has
been an increasing awareness of the legal, ﬁnancial,
and operational risks that new payment technologies
and competitors can cause within payment systems.
There can be serious adverse ﬁnancial consequences
for users if these systems and their participants fail to
adequately contain and manage these risks. The main
policy problem for payment systems is how best to
beneﬁt from the efﬁciency gains while preserving, or
even enhancing, the ability of participants, ﬁnancial
institutions, and systems to manage payment risks.
In this context, four recent developments are worthy
of note: the greater use of electronic payment instru-
ments; the outsourcing of payment processing by
ﬁnancial institutions; the separation in the settlement
of wholesale and retail payments; and the relaxation
of regulatory constraints on access to payment infra-
structure systems.
Electronic payment instruments
The declining cost and increasing availability of high-
quality IT hardware, software, and network communi-
cations have encouraged the global development and
adoption of new electronic payment instruments and
transaction systems. Financial institutions in Canada
have led the trend to replace paper-based currency
and cheques with lower-cost electronic payment
media, including payment cards and automated elec-
tronic funds transfers. Chart 2 indicates the trends in
the volume and value of the use of non-cash paper-
based and electronic retail payment instruments in
Canada since 1991.
The shift towards electronic payments prompted
ﬁnancial institutions to invest even further in the
development of both proprietary and shared elec-
tronictransactionsystemsandnetworkarrangements,
such as their own Internet and telebanking systems
and the shared Interac networks. Although costly to
develop and install, these systems have comparatively
low costs per transaction so that economic beneﬁts are
achieved through broad usage. Consequently, the par-
ticipating institutions have promoted their use among




In developing electronic payment systems, ﬁnancial
institutions and IT and data-processing ﬁrms formed
alliances to develop specialized applications to pro-
vide payment instruments and transaction services to
their customers. Financial institutions with insufﬁ-
cient resources or payment business to develop their
own proprietary transaction systems contract with
other organizations to provide transaction services to
their clients. The CPA and many of the direct partici-
pants in the ACSS also began to outsource or co-source
various payment-processing activities to ﬁrms and to
establish their own shared-processing organizations
for payments (Freedman and Goodlet 1998, 2002).
Outsourcingpaymentprocessingreducestheoperating
costs of providing payment services and allows ﬁnan-
cial institutions to focus on developing and managing
payment accounts, instruments, and related client
services as the core of their payments function.28 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
Separation of wholesale and
retail payment settlement
The principal ﬁnancial risks in payment systems arise
from uncertainty regarding the ability of institutions
to meet their settlement obligations and to manage
theirliquidity.Thenewinformationtechnologieshave
allowed ﬁnancial institutions to reduce, at a cost, some
of these uncertainties through access to account infor-
mation, transfer processing, and settlement of individ-
ual payments in real time. Even so, settlement risk still
remains and must be managed.
Acquiring sufﬁcient liquidity to meet accumulated
gross intraday payment obligations or collateral to
cover risk exposure from peak intraday gross pay-
ment receivables is too costly to protect systems from
a participant’s default. As a result, payment systems
began to develop settlement arrangements speciﬁcally
for the large-value payments that produce much of
the intraday liquidity costs and risk exposure. These
systems have been separated from those for the high-
volume small-value retail payments so that each type
of system could ﬁnd its own appropriate balance
between controlling risk and saving liquidity. The
CPA, for example, introduced the LVTSin early 1999 to
handle large-value and time-critical payments that
could impose systemic risk—the risk that a default by
one participating institution in the settlement system
could cause other participants to default. In retail sys-
tems such as the ACSS, there is little prospect of signif-
icant systemic risk (Northcott 2002) and the focus is
more on cost and liquidity saving than risk control.
Accordingly, the CPA has begun to adjust the rules
and procedures in the ACSS to improve its operations
for retail payments.
Relaxation of regulatory constraints
In Canada, regulatory liberalization in the ﬁnancial
sector has had profound effects on domestic payment
systems and service markets. The 1992 legislation to
reform the ﬁnancial services sector produced many of
the recent regulatory and policy changes affecting
payment systems in Canada, including allowing non-
deposit-taking ﬁnancial institutions to participate in
the payment-service markets through deposit-taking
subsidiaries (Freedman 1998). In 1996, new policy ini-
tiatives further enhanced competition in payment-
service markets (Daniel 2002–2003). The new Payment
Clearing and Settlement Act (PCSA) strengthened the
legal foundation for effective limits on systemic risk in
key payment, securities, and foreign exchange clear-
ing and settlement systems. It also requires that the
Paper vs Electronic Instruments
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Bank of Canada designate for oversight clearing and
settlement systems that could pose systemic risk. The
PCSA supported the development of the LVTS, which
allowed the ACSS to concentrate on clearing and set-
tling retail payments.
With regard to competition, the Competition Tribunal
issued a Consent Order to Interac in 1996 that
required the organization to broaden access to its
transaction systems and to alter its pricing policies to
facilitate new entry and competition among system
participants. In addition, the Interac Association was
required to eliminate access fees to its shared transac-
tion networks for ATM and EFT/POS services and is
allowed to recover its costs only through per transac-
tion “switch” fees charged to participants.4 Since 1996,
membership in Interac has almost quintupled, and
demand for its services has increased correspondingly.
The government also established two study groups in
1996 to review and advise on public policy in the
ﬁnancial sector. The Payment System Advisory Com-
mittee (PSAC) focused on efﬁciency, risk control, and
consumer interests in domestic payment systems,
especially retail payment systems (PSAC 1997b). The
Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial
Services Sector took a much broader view of ﬁnancial
service markets, incorporating many of the ﬁndings of
the PSAC into its recommendations on payment sys-
tems (Task Force 1998). These and other studies
resulted in legislative changes that allow branches of
foreign banks to operate in Canada. Some foreign banks
had already been lending in Canada on a remote basis
(i.e., without a physical presence).5 New shared ATM
networks and debit-card systems also emerged as
niche-market service providers with small shared
regional networks or a broader range of services for
speciﬁc institutional groups such as credit unions.
Some, such as MasterCard’s off-line debit-card sys-
tem, focus on cross-border retail payment markets
with only limited activity in domestic payment markets.
4. Participants pay switch fees to cover the network operator’s cost of routing
the payment information through the communication switches that link the
individual participants into the network. Participants can also impose inter-
change fees among themselves to cover their own processing costs for inter-
bank transfers, as well as surcharges and other user charges on customers
who use their services.
5. Since 1980, foreign banks have been allowed to operate in Canada through
wholly-owned subsidiaries. Incorporated in Canada, these subsidiaries, and
those of other ﬁnancial institutions, are legally regarded as Canadian banking
ﬁrms. Conversely, Canadian branches of ﬁnancial institutions incorporated
outside Canada are not independent legal entities under Canadian jurisdiction.
Additional legislative changes to promote greater
competition, efﬁciency, and responsiveness to con-
sumer needs in domestic ﬁnancial service markets
were enacted in 2002. Changes affecting payment sys-
tems were embodied in the CP Act. It opened mem-
bership in the CPA and access to the ACSS, which is
perceived as contributing to effective competition in
the end-user markets for retail payments. Non-
deposit-taking institutions, speciﬁcally life insurance
companies, securities dealers, and money market
mutual funds, are now eligible to join the CPA and
participate in the ACSS. Some of these institutions
were already providing payment services and partici-
pating in the CPA through deposit-taking subsidiaries.
Others expressed a preference for providing payment
services to clients directly through their parent com-
panies, although none have yet chosen to become CPA
members. The CP Act also provided broad payment
oversight powers to the Minister of Finance. Conse-
quently, the Department of Finance and the Bank of
CanadaestablishedthePaymentAdvisoryCommittee
(PAC) to coordinate their individual oversight activi-
ties and to advise the Governor of the Bank of Canada
and the Minister of Finance on payment issues of com-
mon interest.
Issues and Initiatives in Retail
Payment Systems
The issues currently emerging in Canada are rooted in
the developments of the past decade and in the ongo-
ing search for an appropriate efﬁciency-risk trade-off
as payment systems continue to evolve. The main
issues concern the infrastructure and markets for pay-
ment services; the application of new payment tech-
nologies; and competition among, and access to,
infrastructure systems for retail payments. The CPA
and other payment-industry organizations, often in
collaboration with the authorities responsible for pay-
ment oversight, have already begun to address some
of these issues.
While the Canadian Payments
Association and other public and
private organizations are beginning
to address many of the key issues,
others are just now emerging.30 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
Infrastructure and services
To reduce the real costs of payment infrastructure
services for ﬁnancial institutions and, ultimately, for
their customers, the efforts to improve the efﬁciency
and quality of these services are virtually continuous.
There are, however, a number of difﬁcult business
issues concerning how best to design and implement
these improvements. The principal ones are related to
tiered participation in clearing and settlement systems,
the efﬁcient use of the LVTS for settling retail pay-
ments, and the infrastructure for cross-border retail
payments.
Tiered participation
Virtually all transaction, clearing, and settlement sys-
tems operating in Canada have a tiered participation
structure. Thus, some member institutions in a system
access the network services through other institutions
that participate directly in the network arrangement.6
Since the set-up and operating costs for direct partici-
pation in the ACSS can be quite signiﬁcant, especially
for institutions with relatively small payment vol-
umes, indirect participation can be efﬁcient for many
members. Some direct participants in the settlement
network (called clearing agents) ﬁnd the provision of
clearing and settlement services to indirect partici-
pants an attractive business line, as long as they are
able to efﬁciently contain settlement risks that indirect
participants may impose on them and on the system.
One issue is the criteria for direct participation in the
ACSS. With more diverse types of ﬁnancial institutions
participating in the CPA, as well as technological and
policy changes in recent years that have altered the
processing costs and settlement risks to clearing mem-
bers, CPA members have requested a review of the
conditions for participation as a direct clearer and as a
clearing agent in the ACSS. For example, because life
insurance companies and money market mutual
funds have different regulatory arrangements and
legalregimesthandeposit-takinginstitutions,theyare
currently permitted to participate only as indirect
clearers.7 While most members would prefer more
6.  There may also be institutions that provide payment services to end-users
that are not members of a system. They access these services through a con-
tractual arrangement with another institution that participates in the system.
Some payment-card issuers, Internet-payment service providers, and wire-
transfer service providers are examples.
7.  In addition to the institutional restrictions on direct participation in the
ACSS, there is, at present, a requirement that direct clearers must clear at least
0.5 per cent of the annual volume of the system. All CPA members are eligible
to participate directly in the LVTS.
open conditions for direct participation, some are con-
cerned with the risks and costs that this could impose
on the system. Since a change in the participation con-
ditions would require a statutory amendment to the
ACSS bylaw of the CP Act, the CPA, the Department of
Finance, and the Bank of Canada have established a
joint study group to examine this issue. It plans to pro-
vide a report and recommendations to the CPA Board
and to the Minister of Finance by the end of 2004.
Closely related to this issue is access to settlement facili-
ties at the Bank of Canada. Direct participation in the
CPA’S settlement systems requires access to settlement
accounts at the Bank of Canada. The Bank’s policy is
to provide overnight credit to account holders as well.
A key element of this arrangement is that the Bank of
Canada must have a legally valid, first-priority security
interest in the collateral pledged for the credit. Since
some ﬁnancial institutions are subject to different
bankruptcy regimes and pledging restrictions than
those that govern deposit-taking institutions, the Bank
may ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to obtain such a valid, ﬁrst-
priority security interest over their pledged assets.
Recognizing that having a settlement account without
access to overnight credit would reduce the appeal of
participating directly in the ACSS for eligible institu-
tions, the Bank of Canada has been examining various
options for providing access to settlement facilities for
all institutional classes of CPA members that could
become direct participants in the ACSS. The fact that
the ACSS net obligations are now settled over the LVTS
helps resolve this issue (Tuer 2003). The collateral
pledged to cover the credit used to settle ACSS obliga-
tions would be associated with LVTS payments so that
the Bank’s security interest in pledges by all types of
institutions participating in the LVTS would be legally
protected from stays on execution by the PCSA.
Another concern with tiered participation is risk and
market concentration. As relatively few clearing agents
provide clearing and settlement services to indirect
participants in a settlement system, the volume and
value of payments settled over the accounts of the
clearing agent rise relative to those settled over the
interbank settlement system. Competition in clearing-
agency services helps to ensure that the quality of the
services remains high and that the price at which they
are supplied closely reﬂects their true production and
risk-management costs.
In Canada, only a few direct participants in the ACSS
act as clearing agents for indirect clearers. In effect,
they operate their own clearing and settlement sys-31 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
tems (called quasi-systems) within the CPA. An
untimely failure of one of the principal clearing agents
could severely disrupt the settlement of the ACSS and
could cause repercussions in end-user markets for
retail payment services. Similarly, the failure of a
major indirect clearer could create ﬁnancial difﬁculties
both for its clearing agent, which may bear some risk
for settling the obligations of the failed indirect clearer
in the ACSS, and for other participants to which it
owes funds.
In addition to maintaining effective competition in the
market for clearing-agency services, there is the issue
of how to improve transparency and control risks in
quasi-systems (CPSS 2003). The CPA’s current rules
and procedures for the ACSS have some limited appli-
cation to defaults in the clearing agents’ quasi-sys-
tems. Also, the Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions (OSFI), which supervises and
regulates most of the ﬁnancial institutions currently
participating in the CPA, monitors the overall ﬁnancial
risk-management programs of the principal clearing
agents. However, the controls speciﬁcally developed
by clearing agents to manage ﬁnancial and opera-
tional risk for their own quasi-systems are not very
transparent. The joint study group on direct participa-
tion in the ACSS (the CPA, the Bank of Canada, and the
Department of Finance) will examine this issue.
Efﬁcient use of the LVTS for large-value
retail payments
A crucial issue for retail payment systems in Canada
is the further migration of large-value payments from
the ACSS to the LVTS. Not all payments cleared and
settled through retail payment systems are small in
absolute terms or in relation to the ﬁnancial resources
of the payer or the receiver. For example, individual
cheque payments in the ACSS of $50,000 or more
accounted for only 0.15 per cent of the total volume,
but made up 57 per cent of the value in 2002, with
their aggregate annual value equal to 208 times gross
domestic income. The evidence suggests that the ACSS
is not presently subject to signiﬁcant levels of systemic
risk, but that particular institutions can, at times, bring
substantial settlement risk to the system, or can be
substantially exposed to risks that could cause notable
losses for participants (Northcott 2002). For this rea-
son, ﬁnancial risks to the participants in the ACSS that
anticipate the receipt of large-value retail payments
could be reduced further if the individual large-value
payments were to migrate from the ACSS to the LVTS.
Improving the quality of payment
infrastructure services and the
ﬁnancial safety of participants in the
ACSS must be balanced against the
higher per payment costs to the
participants and their customers.
Individual CPA members that participate in both the
ACSS and the LVTS are reluctant, for legal as well as
business reasons, to unilaterally require their clients to
send through the LVTS large-value payments that are
now cleared and settled through the ACSS. Even
though there is no minimum value for individual
LVTS payments and the migration of large-value retail
payments would be safer for all the institutions partic-
ipating in the ACSS, the higher per payment cost to
their clients limits demand for this safety. The added
features of payment irrevocability, immediacy of set-
tlement, and real-time payment information in the
LVTS are typically more valuable to clients when they
are receiving large-value payments than when they
are making them. As well, most business clients are
subject to signiﬁcant ﬁnancial risk only when rare
problems of payment default occur in the ACSS settle-
ment. Nevertheless, in July 2002, the CPA mandated
that large-value paper payments of $25 million and
over would no longer be eligible for clearing and set-
tlement through the ACSS as of August 2003 because
of the substantial settlement risk involved. Although
it affects only a few hundred payments per day, the
$25 million value cap is estimated to have already
reduced the aggregate value settled by the ACSS by
about 16 per cent.
Since this initiative is expected to reduce ﬁnancial risk
for all ACSS participants, proposals have emerged to
extend the value cap to all electronic payment streams
in the ACSS. Most of the payments in these streams are
“bulk” payments—individual payments that have
beenconsolidatedforinterbankclearing.Theissuethe
CPA needs to address is whether the gains in collec-
tive ﬁnancial safety for all ACSS participants and their
clients are sufﬁcient to warrant the restructuring costs
imposed on the individual participants and the higher
per payment costs imposed on their customers.32 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
Cross-border retail payment systems
Although there is little conclusive statistical evidence
available, survey and anecdotal evidence suggest that
cross-border retail payments, though still small in vol-
ume and value compared to domestic payments, are
growing at a noticeable pace (CPSS 2003). In addition
to retail payments for cross-border business travel and
tourism, business-to-business payments and person-
to-business e-commerce transactions are rising as
cross-border retail trade rises. In Canada, most of
these payments involve U.S. residents and global
card-payment systems like Visa and MasterCard for
credit, ATM, and debit-card transactions. The inter-
bank settlement of these and most other payment obli-
gations takes place through correspondent banking
arrangements in which a private bank in one country
has a foreign currency settlement account with a pri-
vate bank in another country. Some of the correspond-
ent relationships for Canadian banks that involve
U.S.-dollar and euro electronic payments are part of
multilateral cross-border clearing arrangements.8 To
date, however, these and other initiatives have had lit-
tle market success. Limited payment volumes and val-
ues, along with substantial investments sunk into
existing bilateral correspondent banking arrange-
ments, have yet to offer a compelling business case for
participation in multilateral clearing systems.
Recentregulatory changeswithintheEuropean Union
(EU) have renewed initiatives for some form of cross-
border arrangements between the domestic clearing
organizations in the Eurosystem, which is the pay-
ment system for countries that use the euro. Clearing
organizations in other EU countries with their own
currencies but with increasing cross-currency pay-
ments with the Eurosystem, as well as some clearing
organizations in the United States, are considering
participation in some of these initiatives. Also, key
global service organizations such as the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT), which provide standardized payment-mes-
saging services, have begun designing applications
for the cross-border transmission of batch-payment
ﬁles for retail payments. As multilateral standards
develop and become more broadly accepted for clear-
ing cross-border retail payments, the business case for
8.  Canadian ﬁnancial institutions already participate in some arrangements
for the delivery and clearing of cross-border retail payments, such as the
Federal Reserve System’s International Automated Clearing House (IACH)
Service and the Transferts Interbancaires de Paiements Automatisés Network
(TIPANET) operated by the TIPA Group S.C.
participation strengthens. The issue for Canadian
ﬁnancial institutions will be whether to reconsider
their participation in some multilateral arrangements.
Application of new payment technologies
Innovations in information technologies have encour-
aged the development of more diverse and sophisti-
cated payment applications for retail payments. This
is especially so for electronic payment instruments
and transaction systems involving the Internet. How-
ever, these developments continue to raise issues such
as the security of payment information, the develop-
ment of common standards for interoperability and
straight-through processing, and the substitutability
of low-cost electronic payments for paper-based pay-
ments.
Security of payment information
In retail payment transaction systems, there is a ﬁnan-
cial impetus to shift away from the closed, dedicated
structures for transmitting information used by financial
institutions in their proprietary and shared electronic
banking systems towards lower-cost, open structures
for multiple users, like the World Wide Web. Using a
more ﬂexible transmission architecture to transmit a
wide range of information can lower overall transac-
tion costs. The two principal problems with this strategy
are the protection of the information from unauthor-
ized access both during transmission and within the
merchants’ and service providers’ information storage
domains, and the accurate veriﬁcation of the true
identity of all the parties engaged in a payment trans-
action. Open-architecture systems designed for multi-
ple users are more vulnerable to theft of information
and identity than are the dedicated closed systems
that can specialize in very high-level protection of all
transmitted information.
Credit cards are the traditional payment instrument
most used in e-commerce transactions. Consequently,
card companies such as Visa and MasterCard have
been upgrading their secure transmission protocols—
Secure Electronic Transmission (SET) standards—to
accommodate information transmission over more
open architectures. Upgrades are also progressing in
technologies for the payment cards and related
devices that contain, read, and initiate transmission of
encoded information on the identity of the cardholder,
the payment account, and the routing of payment
requests and authorizations. Over the past year, some
initiatives that have been announced in Canada
included using integrated circuit chips—mini-com-
puters—embedded within the payment cards and33 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
using the Europay-Visa-MasterCard (EMV) standards
for chip-card security. This technology can also lower
user cost by supporting multiple information func-
tions in addition to payments on a single chip card.
Although payment cards with enhanced information
security are considered well suited for remote pay-
ments over the Internet, other secure electronic credit
and debit-payment instruments are being developed
for this purpose. Over the past few years, the CPA and
other organizations have established frameworks for
public key infrastructures (PKI)—arrangements for
managing processes and programs required for secure
transactions over the Internet. The CPAalso published
a set of principles and guidelines for payments over
open-communication networks (CPA 2000). The
federal government passed legislation protecting the
privacy of electronic information and validating elec-
tronic documents and digital signatures. It also estab-
lished codes of practice for consumer protection in e-
commerce and e-payments. Finally, in the past year,
a joint public-private working group involving the
CPA, Industry Canada, and interested private organi-
zations published a discussion draft of a set of princi-
ples for electronic authentication (Industry Canada
2003).
New payment technologies and
standards for infrastructure services
can help to improve the quality of
services, lower real payment costs,
and reduce some existing payment
risks while introducing new ones.
Since the legal foundations for open-system electronic
payments and the industry standards for information
security and authentication are still evolving, the
payment applications for these technologies are
largely in their infancy. Also, further public and private
initiatives to develop these technologies will continue,
as there is yetnoclear indication of which new payment
technologies and products will ultimately become
commercially viable. One difﬁcult issue to consider in
this regard is the question of interoperability—the
capacity for users in one system to access that system
through the services of another system.
Interoperability and straight-through processing
Technical innovation challenges established standards
and, if successful, establishes new standards for com-
mercial applications. To a large extent, the commercial
success of new technical standards developed by the
private sector depends on the ease with which they
can be incorporated into new applications by a broad
range of service providers. Key challenges for the
public sector in this process are to identify and remove
remaining legal barriers to the development of open-
system electronic payments and to facilitate the devel-
opment of fundamental principles for such applications.
Technical standards for the “backbone” of open sys-
tems are designed for widespread use. This is not
always true for payment applications. Service provid-
ers customize their payment products and contractu-
ally limit access to them to generate the required
commercial returns on investments and to fund future
projects. The incentives for extending interoperability
to other payment infrastructure systems can therefore
be limited. For example, the standards and technolo-
gies of many PKI infrastructures are not fully compati-
ble with the CPA’S PKI, and the systems are thus not
interoperable. Without interoperability, only some
systems and products can survive competitively, and
the expansion of user demand is often slowed. In fact,
the CPA recently decided to postpone further develop-
ment of its PKI until a greater need for this service
emerges. Discussions among private and public sector
PKI operators have recently begun to address this
issue. The challenge for the private sector is to deter-
mine the minimum extent to which a new open-archi-
tecture payment application and system needs to be
interoperable and accessible to other retail providers
of similar services to make it proﬁtable.
Another form of interoperability, called straight-
through processing, takes place between the infra-
structure systems and applications that provide com-
plementary services at different levels of payment
processing. These include the proprietary payment
marketing and processing systems used by payment
providers and their outsourced processors, shared
transaction networks, and clearing systems. Although
standardizing these systems can reduce operating
costs, security risks, and operational risks, it is difﬁ-
cult to coordinate when institutions have sunk exten-
sive investments in already existing systems, and the
success of any new system is uncertain. The CPA’S
recent initiatives as well as its published standards
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aimed at ﬁnding broad open standards to help make
the front-end marketing, processing, and transaction
systems compatible with the communication and
operating standards for clearing and settlement.
Cheque truncation and electronic cheques
Given the uncertainty about the acceptability of new
retail payment instruments, a common strategy is to
innovate around established instruments. The single
most established retail payment instrument in Canada
is the cheque, and two strategies for lowering the cost
of using and processing retail-cheque payments are
paper-cheque truncation and electronic cheques.
Cheque truncation would allow ﬁnancial institutions
receiving paper cheques for deposit to transform the
instructions into digital form for internal electronic
processing, clearing, and settlement. At present, the
payment information on cheques is recorded electron-
ically by the receiving institution for daily clearing
and provisional settlement through the ACSS. How-
ever, the paper cheques must also be delivered daily
to regional locations of the ﬁnancial institution on
which they are drawn and then sent overnight to the
branch holding the customer’s account to verify the
signature and the availability of funds. This is a costly
procedure.
Transmission and storage costs for electronic images
are signiﬁcantly lower than for the paper items. The
truncation of paper cheques means that digital images
of the cheques can be delivered electronically from the
receiving institution to the paying institution to verify
customersignaturesandpaymentobligationsthrough
centralized on-line account information systems.
Some of the major participants in the ACSS have already
invested in digital-imaging technology to avoid trans-
porting paper items to their branches, and the CPA is
currently developing ACSS operating rules and stand-
ards for receiver truncation of cheques. The federal
government has also begun to assess the necessary
legislative changes.
An electronic cheque, rather than a paper-based cheque,
is one instrument for Internet payments used in some
electronic bill-presentment and payment schemes.
Early in 2003, the CPA published a policy framework
for clearing and settling one-time debit and credit
payments, including electronic cheques (CPA2003). To
expand the range of cost-efﬁcient electronic cheque
payments acceptable for clearing and settlement over
the ACSS, the ﬁnancial, legal, and operational risks
will need to be addressed. These include credibly
securing the information contained in electronic pay-
ment instruments, clarifying the legal status of the
instruments, and standardizing their design. Recent
private and public initiatives have already begun to
address some of these issues.
Access and competition
A degree of co-operation among participating institu-
tions in member-owned shared-transaction systems
and clearing and settlement systems, such as Interac,
Visa, and the ACSS, is necessary for the management
of payment risk and the efﬁciency gains related to
product and system innovation, standard-setting, and
networking. However, the incentives to allocate the
risks, costs, and beneﬁts appropriately among the var-
ious payment-service providers and users participat-
ing in retail payment infrastructure systems and end-
user markets depend on effective competition in
many of these payment-service markets (PSAC 1997c).
End-user markets, where ﬁnancial institutions vie
with each other to provide retail payment instruments
and services, are the most open to competition, fol-
lowed by some common transaction systems for simi-
lar payment instruments and services, and various
payment-processing and IT outsource providers used
by individual institutions and the CPA.
Co-operation in organizing and
operating transaction, clearing, and
settlement systems is necessary, yet
efﬁcient markets for payment services
depend on competition among their
members.
The recent legislative changes, regulatory efforts, and
policy initiatives to open access for a broader range of
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial institutions to Interac, the
ACSS, and the Bank of Canada’s settlement facilities
were aimed at further enhancing competition and efﬁ-
ciency in retail payment-service markets. The continu-
ing market pressure for even more open access to
payment-infrastructure organizations and service
markets raises some questions, however. Two of the
most difﬁcult issues are differential regulation among
similar infrastructure systems and remote access to
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Regulation of infrastructure systems
In Canada, some transaction, clearing, and settlement
systems for retail payments are regulated, while oth-
ers are not. For example, payment-infrastructure sys-
tems for retail services such as the ACSS and Interac’s
SCD and IDP systems are regulated under the CP Act
and the Consent Order of the Competition Tribunal,
respectively. As the predominant national providers
of infrastructure services for particular instruments,
they are considered essential systems for retail pay-
ments. To be competitive, institutions that offer, or
wish to offer, these instruments and services to end-
users need access to them. As new retail payment
instruments and expanded menus of payment services
have emerged, new infrastructure systems that com-
pete against the national systems in providing infra-
structure services have begun to develop. Some
examples are the Exchange ATM network, Master-
Card’s off-line debit card system, and CertaPay, an
Internet bill payment system. Unlike the CPA and
Interac, these new systems are typically unregulated.
However, they generally operate predominately in
local, not national, markets and offer services only
through a limited number of ﬁnancial institutions.
Regulation has both beneﬁts and costs. Regulated dis-
closure requirements, restrictions on operating prac-
tices, and a greater need for legal services can impose
a cost burden. However, regulated organizations often
have greater access to the public authorities and their
services than do unregulated entities. They can use
regulation to help develop initiatives and coordinate
actions that beneﬁt all participants in the system and
to instill conﬁdence in the users of the payment sys-
tems. The entry of new infrastructure systems to these
markets therefore raises concerns about the ability of
regulated and unregulated providers of similar infra-
structure services to compete evenly.
The key challenges for the public sector are to specify
criteria for regulation that are clear enough to elimi-
nate potentially disruptive policy uncertainty and to
remove the unintended regulatory barriers to effective
competitionamongregulatedandunregulatedservice
providers. The challenge for private sector infrastruc-
ture organizations is to develop a business strategy
ﬂexible enough to accommodate the emerging service
needs of even small groups of their members.
Remote participation
At present, remote participation—the provision of
retail payment services by organizations incorporated
and located in other countries—in Canadian retail
payment systems is limited to payment-processing
and clearing services, principally for global card pay-
ments. Most other payment services can be provided
only by branches of Canadian ﬁrms and incorporated
subsidiaries of foreign ﬁrms. Recently, however, there
have been requests from foreign institutions to
remotely access settlement facilities at the Bank of
Canada and to participate remotely in the CPA’S settle-
ment systems. Although most requests were initially
for participation in the LVTS, remote participation in
the ACSS would facilitate clearing and settlement of
the growing number of cross-border retail payments
as well. Foreign institutions specializing in Internet
banking and payment services to clients, some of
which can already remotely provide limited banking
services in Canada, could eliminate the intermedia-
tion costs associated with cross-border clearing and
settlement through correspondent banks. Remote par-
ticipation by Canadian ﬁnancial institutions in foreign
retail payment infrastructure systems would involve
similar cost savings. Currently, remote participation in
Canadian clearing and settlement systems is prohib-
ited, although similar barriers do not exist in all other
countries, notably those in the EU.
The prohibitions on remote participation in Canada
and other countries such as the United States reﬂect
concern over legal risks. Unforeseen legal problems
caused by a default by a remote participant can poten-
tially disrupt the operation of domestic payment
settlement systems and impose payment risks on
domestic participants. For example, the legal validity
of the CPA’s default rules and procedures may be
unrecognized in the jurisdiction of the remote partici-
pant. Also, the credit claims of Canadian entities
participating in the ACSS against a failed remote
participant may be subordinate to similar claims of
residents of the foreign jurisdiction of the remote par-
ticipant. As some of these concerns are resolved and
remote participation becomes more acceptable in prin-
ciple and practice in more countries, the authorities in
Canada will likely wish to review their policies gov-
erning remote participation in retail payment infra-
structure systems as well.
Conclusions
Although retail payment systems may not pose a
systemic threat to the Canadian ﬁnancial system, they
are critical to a well-functioning Canadian economy.
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disruptions in infrastructure systems that can prove
costly for retail commercial and ﬁnancial activities.
Innovations in basic information technologies, in pay-
ment applications, and in global market availability
have produced fundamental changes in retail payments.
There are increasing demands for more and better
low-cost electronic payment instruments and services.
In response, we have observed signiﬁcant new invest-
ment in infrastructure technology and a strategic
reorganization in market arrangements with a widen-
ing range of retail payment services and service provid-
ers. Also, re-regulation in markets for retail payment
services has addressed issues of provider access, the
operations and security of infrastructure systems, and
consumer protection. Operators of retail payment sys-
tems, system participants, and public oversight agen-
cies in Canada, as elsewhere, have begun dealing with
many of the issues these developments raise. All share
the same strategic objective: achieving the right sys-
temwide balance among competing efﬁciency needs,
risk-control mechanisms, and consumer interests to
best serve evolving retail payment systems.
Glossary
Electronic authentication is a process for verifying
the identities of the parties communicating remotely
over an electronic network like the Internet and the
integrity of the message being communicated.
Infrastructure systems for payments consist of the
array of underlying organizations, procedures, instal-
lations, and other facilities that ﬁnancial institutions
require to provide payment instruments and services
to their customers. The services provided by organiza-
tions that operate infrastructure systems are infra-
structure services.
Networks link participating institutions by means of
their communications equipment so that users can
access the proprietary data and services of each partic-
ipating institution through its own or shared equipment
at remote locations. The network operator provides and
maintains the services that interconnect the network.
An open-architecture system is a network operated
by a service provider that directly links multiple users
(e.g., buyers, vendors, and their ﬁnancial intermediar-
ies) for jointly interactive communication sessions. It
can typically be used to transmit a variety of types of
information almost simultaneously and can possibly
ensure different degrees of security for the informa-
tion, depending on the level of conﬁdentiality
required. It contrasts with a closed system, which is a
two-way connection, often over dedicated communi-
cation lines or frequencies.
A payment service provider specializes in providing
a particular type of payment-related service and can
be either a ﬁnancial institution that provides payment
accounts, instruments, and transfer services to its cus-
tomer or a provider of payment infrastructure services,
such as a transaction network operator or a clearing
system operator.
Provisional credit refers to the posting of a payment
value (the credit) to the receiver’s account as soon as
the payment item is presented for collection with the
ﬁnancial institution that provides the customer with a
deposit account. Effectively, provisional credit is a
payment receivable. It is granted on the agreement
that, if the funds are not forthcoming from the ﬁnan-
cial institution on which the payer has drawn the
item, the receiving institution will void the payment
credit to the receiver’s account.
A security interest refers to a contractual agreement
between two parties indicating that one has a prior
legal interest in some of the assets owned by the other.
It secures, for example, a lender’s claim on speciﬁc
assets pledged as collateral by a borrower to cover the
lender if the borrower defaults on the terms of the
loan agreement.
A stay on execution is a court-ordered delay on the
transfer to a lender of collateral pledged by a default-
ing borrower under the terms of the lender’s security
interest. The immediate consequence to the lender is
an unanticipated cost to ﬁnance the loss of cash ﬂow
owing to the default on the loan without liquidation
of the pledged collateral. The ultimate consequence
may be a credit loss if the lender’s security interest is
not upheld by the court.37 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
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